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Abstract: We conducted an experiment in which each subject repeatedly played a game 
with a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies against some computer-implemented 
mixed strategy.  The results indicate subjects are successful at detecting and exploiting 
deviations from Nash equilibrium.  However, there is heterogeneity in subject behavior 
and performance.  We present a one variable model of dynamic random belief formation 




    A Nash equilibrium of a normal form game can be identified as the fixed point of the 
players’ best response correspondences.  The notion that each player anticipates his 
opponents’ actions and best responds to this belief has been an effective approach in the 
analysis of strategic decision making.  However, when opponents adopt mixed strategies, 
we should carefully consider the assumption that a player forms accurate beliefs and best 
responds.  This is especially so in constant-sum games which do not have a pure strategy 
Nash equilibrium.
1  In such games, when opponents don’t play their Nash equilibrium 
strategies, a player typically has a unique pure strategy best response that gives an 
expected payoff greater than the Nash equilibrium level.  Whether a person detects such 
payoff increasing opportunities, however, is an open question.  In this study we report an 
experiment in which subjects repeatedly play a zero-sum game against different constant 
mixed strategies, and examine to what extent subjects detect and exploit such 
opportunities.   
    In our experiment, a subject was assigned one of the two possible roles in an 
asymmetric matching pennies game.  The subject then played 200 repetitions against a 
constant mixed strategy.  The subject was told that he was playing against another 
decision maker, but was not informed that this decision maker was computerized nor the 
nature of the decision maker’s strategy.  We varied the mixed strategy faced by different 
subjects to cover a broad spectrum of possible mixed strategies.  This enables us to 
ascertain the extent to which best response correspondences describe subject behavior. 
    There are two main results.  First, subjects come surprisingly close to best responding 
to an unknown mixed strategy, even if the mixed strategy is no more than fifteen percent 
above or below the Nash equilibrium strategy.  Second, subjects are quite successful at 
exploiting mixed strategies that deviate from Nash equilibrium and, as a consequence, 
increase their payoffs above Nash equilibrium levels.  However, both results only hold on 
average as there is heterogeneity across subject behavior and earnings.    In an attempt to 
characterize this heterogeneity, we introduce a single variable adaptive belief model that 
                                                 
1 The minimax and Nash equilibrium solutions coincide in this setting, and we could proceed only referring 
to the minimax solution and strategies.  However, we proceed using the Nash equilibrium framework 
because we wish to focus on the concept of best response.  
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we call the “Random Hierarchal Belief” model.  The model is based on the notion that 
before each stage game a subject randomly draws a belief from a Beta distribution and 
then best responds to this belief.  The two shape parameters of the Beta distribution are 
discounted counts of the opponent’s previous action choices. The disount rate of these 
counts is a subject specific variable that generates differential behavior. /We estimate this 
discount variable for each of our subjects and then present simulations to demonstrate 
that the model generates the qualitative dynamics and heterogeneity reflected in the data. 
     Our study extends and clarifies the results of previous studies of play in 2°2 zero-
sum games with a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies.  Lieberman [1961] and Fox 
[1972] both studied subject play against a mixed strategy that deviated from Nash 
equilibrium.  They discovered that subjects significantly adjust their play and increase 
their earnings.  However, in these studies only a single non-Nash strategy was evaluated, 
and this strategy differed from the Nash strategy by a probability greater than twenty-five 
percent.  In our study, we systematically vary the mixed strategies to obtain a more 
complete characterization of how humans play in these situations and we take advantage 
of more sophisticated software to provide each subject a complete history past play. 
    Next we describe the experimental design and procedures.  In the third section we 
address how subjects’ choice frequencies adjust from the first half to the second half of 
the experiment, examine whether subjects increase their payoffs above Nash equilibrium 
levels, and present the Random Hierarchical Belief model to explain the dynamics and 
heterogeneity found in the data.  In the final section, we offer some concluding remarks. 
 
II. Experimental Design and Protocols 
 
    We employ a zero-sum asymmetric matching pennies game (introduced by Rosenthal, 
Shachat, and Walker [2002]).  In the game each player can move either Left or Right.  
The normal form representation of the game is given in the table below.  The game has a 
unique Nash equilibrium in which each player chooses Left with probability two-thirds.  
When Column doesn’t adopt the equilibrium strategy, Row’s best response is to play Left 
if Column chooses Left with a probability greater than two-thirds, and to play Right 
otherwise. Likewise when Row doesn’t adopt the equilibrium strategy, Column’s best  
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response is to play Right if Row plays Left with a probability greater than two-thirds, and 
to play Left otherwise. In equilibrium, Row’s expected payoff is 2/3 and Column’s 
expected payoff is –2/3. 
  
  Column Player 
  Left  Right 
Row Player 
Left 1,-1  0,0 
 
Right 0,0  2,-2 
 
    We conducted all experimental sessions in the Economic Science Laboratory at the 
University of Arizona during the Fall of 2002.  We report results from seven sessions, 
using a total of 102 undergraduate students.  Each session contained between 8 and 22 
subjects.  Half of the subjects were assigned as Row players, and the other half were 
assigned as Column players.   
    Each subject was seated at a computer workstation such that no subject could observe 
another subject’s screen.  Subjects first read computerized instructions that detailed both 
how to enter decisions and how earnings were determined.  Then, 200 repetitions of the 
game were played.  Column subjects were initially endowed with a balance of 250 
tokens, while Row players began with no tokens: each token was valued at 10¢.  Each 
subject’s total earnings consisted of a $5 show-up payment plus his token balance after 
the 200
th repetition.  No Column subjects went bankrupt.
2 
    At the beginning of each repetition, a subject saw a graphical representation of the 
game on the screen.  Each Column subject’s game displays transformed so that he 
appeared to be a Row player.  Thus, each subject selected an action by clicking on a row, 
                                                 
2 Notice that the possible Row subjects’ stage game payoffs were all non-negative (gains) and the possible 
Column subjects’ payoffs were all non-positive (losses.)  In studies of individual decision making under 
uncertainty, for example Kahneman and Tversky (1979), it is often concluded that individuals are risk 
averse when all possible outcomes are gains and risk loving when all possible outcomes are losses. In our 
experiment such preferences shift the opponent’s mixed strategy that renders a Row or Column subject 
indifferent between Left and Right to something less than two-thirds. As we will see shortly, there isn’t 
strong evidence of such an effect in the data.  
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and then confirmed his selection.  After the repetition was complete, each subject saw the 
outcome highlighted on the game display, as well as a text message stating both players’ 
actions and his own earnings for that repetition.  Finally, at all times a subject’s current 
token balance and a history of past play were displayed.  The history consisted of an 
ordered list with each row displaying the repetition number, the actions selected by both 
players, and the subject’s payoffs from the specific repetition. 
    Each subject played against a fixed computerized mixed strategy.  The various mixed 
strategies adopted and the number of subjects who played against them are presented 
below.  Each subject was informed that he was going to play against the same decision 
maker for all repetitions: he was not informed that the decision maker was a computer or 
the nature of the decision maker’s strategy.  Although human subjects never played 
against each other, each Row subject was matched with a Column subject: this was done 
to reduce the chance a subject believed he was playing against a computer.  Specifically, 
while the computer generated instantaneous action choices, the software did not reveal 
the computer’s action until both paired human subjects had made action selections.  This 
process allowed the pair to progress at a more natural rate determined by the response 
speed of the two subjects. 
 
Percentage Left  Number of 












III. Data Analysis 
 
    We start the data analysis by addressing to what extent subjects best respond to 
different mixed strategies.  We find that a subject’s play is likely to move substantially  
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towards his best response when his opponent’s choice frequencies are more than fifteen 
percent above or below the Nash equilibrium frequencies.  Correspondingly, we find that 
subjects achieve a statistically significant increase in payoffs above Nash equilibrium 
levels when facing mixed strategies that deviate from the Nash equilibrium by more than 
fifteen percent.  However, there is heterogeneity across subjects to the degree they best 
respond and maximize potential payoffs.  We present a single parameter random belief 
adjustment model that rationalizes this heterogeneity. 
 
III.1 Best Response and Payoff Gains 
     
   A natural starting point is to inspect how often each subject best responds when his 
opponent’s choice frequencies deviate from the Nash prediction.  We present this view of 
the data for the Row subjects in Figure 1 and for the Column subjects in Figure 2.  In 
each of these figures, the solid line represents the subjects’ best response correspondence.  
Also, each arrow is a summary of play for a single human/computer pair.  The origin of 
the arrow is located at the joint frequency of Left play in the first 100 stage games, and 
the tip of the arrowhead is located at the joint frequency of Left play in the second 100 
stage games.  These arrows show the adjustments subjects make from the first-half to the 
second-half experiment regarding how often subjects best respond. 
    We can make several observations from these figures.  First, the further his opponent 
deviates from Nash equilibrium frequencies of Left play the more likely a subject is to 
best respond.  However, this statement needs two qualifications.  First, the opponents’ 
deviations must be sufficiently far from equilibrium to see all subjects’ move close to the 
best response.  Also, it is clear the subjects’ frequencies of Left play differ in the 
magnitudes of adjustment from the first half to second half of the experiment. However, 
we can’t identify if these movements towards best response result from learning about the 
opponent or learning about the functioning of the experiment. Finally, when his 
opponent’s play is near the Nash equilibrium strategy, the human’s proportions are biased 
towards levels below the Nash equilibrium proportion. 
    We provide a statistical evaluation of whether a subject’s play is significantly towards 
his best response.  First, we establish a baseline for when play is decidedly in the  
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direction of best responding.  When the subject’s best response is to play Left, we say 
that his play is “better responding” if his probability of Left play exceeds two-thirds.  
Similarly, when the subject’s best response is to play Right, we say he is better 
responding if his probability of playing Left is less than one-half.
3  Utilizing these 
baselines, we construct two hypothesis tests for play in the last one hundred stage games.  
The first is a binomial test for which the null hypothesis is that the subject’s probability 
of Left play equals two-thirds and the alternative hypothesis is that this probability 
exceeds two thirds.  At the five percent level of significance, we reject the null in favor of 
the alternative whenever a subject plays Left more than seventy-five times.  We depict 
the critical region of this test on Figures 1 and 2 with a dashed line at the subject 
proportion of .75 within the area for which Left is a best response.  The second 
hypothesis test is another binomial test with the null hypothesis that the subject’s 
probability of Left play is fifty percent and the alternative is that the probability is less 
than fifty percent.  At the five percent level of significance, we reject the null hypothesis 
whenever a subject plays Left fewer than forty-one times.  We depict the critical region 
of this test on Figures 1 and 2 with a dashed line at the subject proportion of .41 within 
the area for which Right is a best response. 
    We note that frequencies of Left play fall out of the two critical regions of better 
responding for only 16 of 51 Row subjects and 17 of 51 Column subjects.  For Row 
subjects, Left frequencies are all within the critical region for better responding towards 
Left when the computer’s frequency exceeds 80 percent and also within the critical 
region for better responding towards Right when the computer’s frequency of left is less 
than 50 percent.  Likewise, all Column subjects are in the critical region for better 
responding towards Right when the computer’s Left frequency exceeds 80 percent.  
However, the uniform movement towards Column’s critical region for Left doesn’t occur 
until the opponent’s frequency of Left falls below 35%.  Figure 2 demonstrates marked 
heterogeneity in the Column subjects’ tendencies to move towards the best response 
when the opponent’s frequency of Left play is below the Nash equilibrium levels.  We 
will see that this results in differential earnings for the Column subjects. 
                                                 
3 We are choosing the benchmark of fifty percent because we have already noted that the proportion of Left 
human play is biased below two-thirds when the facing Nash equilibrium proportion.  We feel that in this 
instance setting the Null at two-thirds would bias our conclusions towards subjects better responding.  
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    The next metric we consider is the subjects’ average stage game earnings.  We 
ascertain whether subjects successfully exploit non-Nash equilibrium mixed strategies 
and how close they come to maximizing potential payoffs.  In Figures 3 and 4, for the last 
100 stage games, we plot each subject’s average stage game payoff versus his opponent’s 
frequency of Left.  An open circle indicates a subject’s earnings that we can’t reject are 
the same as the Nash equilibrium payoffs, and the solid triangle indicates a subject’s 
earnings that we conclude exceed the Nash equilibrium level.  These conclusions are 
reached via a hypothesis test performed at a five percent level of significance.  The solid 
lines found on Figures 3 and 4 represent the expected payoff from playing the pure 
strategy best response.  As is commonly known, in these games a player’s payoff 
function is relatively flat around his opponent’s Nash equilibrium strategy.  This is 
evident as we see mostly open circles in the frequency range of fifty to eighty percent.  
However, when a computer decision maker deviates from the Nash proportion by more 
than fifteen percent the subjects successfully increase their payoffs.  This is not true in the 
case where Column subjects face mixed strategies less than two-thirds.  Here we observe 
that some subjects fail to exploit mixed strategies as low as thirty percent while other 
subjects’ earnings are close to the maximum expected payoff. 
    While subjects are surprisingly adept, on average, at detecting and exploiting non 
optimal mixed strategies, the heterogeneity of these abilities across subject can’t be 
ignored.  We provide a possible explanation of this heterogeneity by formulating a simple 
adaptive model of play. 
 
III.2 Random Hierarchal Beliefs Model of Heterogeneity and Adjustment  
 
    In this subsection we present a simple one-variable model of random belief formation.  
We then estimate the single variable for each subject.  Lastly we present a simulation, 
which demonstrates the ability of the model to rationalize the heterogeneity observed 
across subjects. 
      Recall the two players are Row and Column, which we will denote by r and c.  Stage 
games are indexed by n.  Each player i’s set of actions is Ai = {L, R} and the action player 
i selects in stage game n is ain.  Player i’s set of mixed strategies is Σi = [0,1].  A mixed  
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strategy, σin∈Σi, is the probability that player i selects L in stage game n. Finally, let bin 
be player i’s belief of what player j’s mixed strategy will be in stage game n.  
    We now propose a one-variable model to describe the dynamics of how subjects 
played the game.  We assume that before each stage game a player’s belief is determined 
by a draw from a distribution over his set of possible beliefs, and that a player selects the 
best response to this belief.  We call this model the Random Hierarchal Belief (RHB) 
model because subjects’ beliefs are determined by a hierarchal probability structure. 
    The belief bin is a random variable which has a Beta distribution function, β( ), with the 
player specific parameters siLn and siRn.  The support of a Beta distribution is the unit 
interval with a mean of  siLn/ (siLn +siRn) and a mode , if both siLn and siRn are greater than 
one, equal to (siLn – 1)/(siLn + siRn –2).  When both parameters are one, the Beta 
distribution is simply the Uniform distribution.  The parameters of the Beta distribution 
have an important interpretation in Bayesian statistics.  If one is modeling a binomial 
process and starts with a Beta prior density, the posterior density is also Beta for which 
the first parameter siLn is incremented by the number of successes and the second 
parameter, siRn, is increment by the number of failures.  These parameters are often called 
the prior sample sizes.  
    Our model follows the spirit of this Bayesian interpretation; the parameters siLn and siRn 
are determined by the observed history of play according to the following rules: 
 
siLn = δ∗ siLn-1 + I{ajn-1=L}     and     siRn = δ ∗ siRn-1 + I{ajn-1=R}    for n > 1, and 
siLn = siRn =1    for n = 1. 
 
The unobservable variable δ  is a discount rate for the two parameters and I{ajn-1=aj} is an 
indicator function for the event that player j chose action aj in the stage game n-1. 
Furthermore, by setting the initial values siL1 = siR1 =1, the player’s belief in the first stage 
game is drawn from a uniform distribution. 
    Consider an example.  Suppose Row has a δ of one-half.  In the first period his belief 
about Column’s mixed strategy is drawn from the uniform distribution on the unit 
interval.  The probability he draws a belief for which L is a best response is 1/3, i.e. 1-
β(2/3,1,1) =1/3. Therefore the model predicts Pr(ar1=L) = 1/3. Now suppose that his 
opponent chooses R in the first period.  With this outcome srL2 = .5 and srR2 = 1.5, and in  
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the second stage game the probability that Row draws a belief for which L is the best 
response, is 1 -β(2/3,.5,1.5) = .09. If Column chose R in the second stage game then srL3 = 
.25 and srR3 = 1.75, and the probability Row chooses L in stage game three is 1-
β(2/3,.25,1.75) = .03. Consider a last iteration in which the Column player selects L in 
stage game three.  In this case srL4 = 1.125 and srR4 = .875, and the Row player selects L 
in the fourth stage game with the probability 1-β(2/3,1.125,1.75) = .41. 
    To better appreciate the flexibility of the RHB model, consider two special cases.  As 
the discount rate δ approaches zero, behavior approaches a simple best response dynamic.  
Also, when the discount rate is one, the mode of the belief distribution follows a fictitious 
play process and the belief is drawn from a Bayesian posterior distribution on the 
opponent’s mixed strategy. 
    Again each of our subjects played against some computer implemented fixed mixed 
strategy.  For each of our subjects, we estimate δ by a maximum likelihood procedure.  
For a Row subject the probability he chose the action L in stage game n is 
 
Pr(arn = L) = 1-β(2/3, srL1(δr), srR1(δr)). 
 
The resulting log-likelihood function for each of our Row subjects is  
{} () () () () {} () () () () ∑
=






2 , , , , 1 ln ln
n
r rRn r rLn R a r rRn r rLn L a s s I s s I L
rn rn δ δ β δ δ β . 
Similarly the log-likelihood function for each of our Column subjects is  
{} () () () {} () () () () () ∑
=






2 , , 1 , , ln ln
n
c cRn c cLn R a c cR c cLn L a s s I s s I L
cn cn δ δ β δ δ β . 
    In Tables 1 and 2 we report for each subject the maximum likelihood estimate of δ and 
the result of a forecasting exercise.  For each subject role estimates are listed in 
increasing order.  The lowest estimate of the variable is .457 and the highest is 1.01.
4  
The third column reports the percentage of Left play by the opponent for all 200 stage 
games.  The fourth through eighth columns report the data and results for a within sample 
forecasting exercise.   
    We asked how well the RHB model predicts play in the last 100 stage games.  For each 
subject, we generate a sequence of choice probabilities of Left using his actual 
                                                 
4 Ωε τρυνχατεδ τηε εστιµατεδ ϖαλυε οφ δ  at 1.01, as the behavior of the likelihood function quickly 
deteriorates as δ exceeds one and estimates are difficult to obtain.  
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opponent’s choices and his estimated value of δ.  We report the average of this sequence 
in the fourth column.  In addition, we calculate the square of the difference between the 
subjects’ predicted choice probability and his actual choice – where a choice of Left is set 
to one and a choice of Right is set to zero – in each of the last 100 stages games and we 
sum these squared differences.  In column six, we report the total sum of squared errors 
of the subject’s estimated choice probabilities.  We also report the subject’s total 
proportion of left play for all 200 stage games in column five, and the total sum of 
squared errors of this proportion for the last 100 stage games in column seven.  We report 
the difference of the two of sum of squared errors statistics in column eight.  The RHB 
generally has a higher sum squared error in two circumstances; either a subject’s 
frequency Left play is on the opposite side of fifty percent from the best response or a 
subject’s frequency of best response is nearly one. 
    Finally we provide a simulation to show how the RHB characterizes diverse subject 
behavior.  For each player type, we start by selecting the lowest and highest estimate 
obtained of δ .  Then we simulate the two RHB models playing 200 stage games of the 
game against a mixed strategy.  For both of the values of delta, we record the proportion 
of Left in the last 100 stage games by the RHB model.  We do this exercise one hundred 
times for a particular mixed strategy.  We then calculate the average proportions of Left 
play in the last 100 stage games for the two values of δ across the one hundred exercises.  
We report these averages as the RHB response to the mixed strategy.  We do this 
simulation for the mixed strategies in the interval [.05, .99] using a step size of .01.  The 
simulation generates a pair of response surfaces for the RHB model, one for the low 
estimate of δ and one for the high estimate of δ.  These response surfaces are presented in 
Figures 5 and 6. 
   Figure 5 presents the response surfaces for the Row player and Figure 6 presents the 
response surfaces for the Column player.  The low value of δ (.457 for the Row player 
and .619 for the Column player) produces a response surface that is almost a line segment 
that connects the two ends of the best response correspondence.  On the other hand, the 
high value of δ (1.01 for both player types) produces a surface that indicates more 
frequent best responses.  The two surfaces show how the RHB model characterizes the 
data.  We display the scatter plot of human/computer joint left frequencies on the figure  
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and the scatter plot is quite similar to the response surfaces.  For example, the subjects 
and the RHB model play Left substantially less often than the Nash equilibrium 
frequency of two-thirds when playing against mixed strategies that are close to the Nash 
equilibrium.  We are encouraged by the ability of the RHB model to account for some of 
the heterogeneity exhibited by the subjects. 
 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
 
    In this paper we test whether subjects can detect and exploit non-equilibrium play in a 
zero-sum game with a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies.  In order to provide an 
informative test we conducted an experiment in which subjects repeatedly play against 
computer implemented mixed strategies.  The mixed strategies were varied across 
subjects.  We observe subjects, on average, doing remarkably well at adjusting their 
strategies towards a best response and achieving payoffs above their Nash equilibrium 
levels.  However, there is substantial heterogeneity in subjects’ behavior and 
performance.  We formulated a single variable model of probabilistic belief formation 
that captures this heterogeneity and other features of the data.  
    There are several directions for further research.  First, one can investigate whether 
subjects can detect and best respond when opponents deviate from Nash equilibrium 
strategies in other classes of games.  Second, the adopted methodology of having humans 
play against preprogrammed strategies can be used to address other open questions in 
game theory such as how do alternative behavioral rules influence the convergence to 
equilibrium when there are multiple equilibria.  Finally, the promising empirical 
performance of the simple Random Hierarchal Belief model should be tested on data sets 
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1 0.457 0.735 0.672 0.680 22.762 43.520 -20.758
2 0.459 0.195 0.132 0.205 23.604 32.595 -8.991
3 0.531 0.560 0.454 0.535 35.177 49.755 -14.578
4 0.538 0.275 0.178 0.250 30.403 37.500 -7.097
5 0.604 0.170 0.078 0.110 18.660 19.580 -0.920
6 0.649 0.230 0.102 0.210 36.422 33.180 3.242
7 0.657 0.350 0.210 0.255 34.927 37.995 -3.068
8 0.705 0.450 0.275 0.485 69.218 49.955 19.263
9 0.723 0.210 0.067 0.065 9.081 12.155 -3.074
10 0.753 0.935 0.935 0.890 17.852 19.580 -1.728
11 0.754 0.740 0.656 0.535 41.659 49.755 -8.096
12 0.767 0.480 0.285 0.255 28.456 37.995 -9.539
13 0.792 0.915 0.917 0.850 22.670 25.500 -2.830
14 0.794 0.560 0.388 0.380 40.830 47.120 -6.290
15 0.797 0.485 0.256 0.290 46.104 41.180 4.924
16 0.804 0.840 0.815 0.850 24.414 25.500 -1.086
17 0.805 0.245 0.054 0.070 12.987 13.020 -0.033
18 0.806 0.825 0.812 0.485 75.230 49.955 25.275
19 0.807 0.810 0.774 0.625 44.342 46.875 -2.533
20 0.816 0.745 0.669 0.570 51.106 49.020 2.086
21 0.820 0.595 0.432 0.490 53.230 49.980 3.250
22 0.824 0.605 0.445 0.515 68.138 49.955 18.183
23 0.826 0.320 0.089 0.085 12.431 15.555 -3.124
24 0.832 0.345 0.090 0.125 22.654 21.875 0.779
25 0.835 0.260 0.040 0.040 7.011 7.680 -0.669
26 0.845 0.740 0.660 0.395 57.490 47.795 9.695
27 0.846 0.475 0.240 0.160 29.176 26.880 2.296
28 0.854 0.885 0.901 0.835 27.447 27.555 -0.108
29 0.859 0.865 0.890 0.835 30.497 27.555 2.942
30 0.864 0.795 0.754 0.620 57.314 47.120 10.194
31 0.885 0.755 0.715 0.515 52.167 49.955 2.212
32 0.888 0.915 0.952 0.950 8.712 9.500 -0.788
33 0.889 0.900 0.918 0.945 12.343 10.395 1.948
34 0.891 0.405 0.111 0.090 11.534 16.380 -4.846
35 0.891 0.740 0.677 0.630 33.710 46.620 -12.910
36 0.893 0.925 0.958 0.905 16.885 17.195 -0.310
37 0.913 0.505 0.192 0.195 31.129 31.395 -0.266
38 0.914 0.870 0.920 0.885 18.104 20.355 -2.251
39 0.916 0.600 0.367 0.480 57.041 49.920 7.121
40 0.930 0.775 0.764 0.730 35.082 39.420 -4.338
41 0.931 0.405 0.058 0.070 10.077 13.020 -2.943
42 0.935 0.830 0.881 0.925 8.648 13.875 -5.227
43 0.940 0.380 0.044 0.085 11.480 15.555 -4.075
44 0.945 0.920 0.979 0.975 4.596 4.875 -0.279
45 0.963 0.505 0.124 0.110 19.636 19.580 0.056
46 0.970 0.540 0.101 0.135 21.436 23.355 -1.919
47 0.975 0.680 0.607 0.445 56.132 49.395 6.737
48 0.978 0.695 0.637 0.800 31.863 32.000 -0.137
49 0.982 0.355 0.020 0.040 3.110 7.680 -4.570
50 0.990 0.640 0.250 0.270 42.797 39.420 3.377
51 1.010 0.655 0.562 0.640 46.527 46.080 0.447
















1 0.619 0.200 0.904 0.885 17.252 20.355 -3.103
2 0.629 0.670 0.423 0.545 35.712 49.595 -13.883
3 0.666 0.375 0.776 0.660 45.452 44.880 0.572
4 0.675 0.350 0.799 0.735 34.648 38.955 -4.307
5 0.689 0.515 0.633 0.650 44.354 45.500 -1.146
6 0.703 0.285 0.871 0.820 23.814 29.520 -5.706
7 0.716 0.790 0.271 0.195 24.344 31.395 -7.051
8 0.722 0.185 0.946 0.935 11.444 12.155 -0.711
9 0.741 0.490 0.688 0.605 57.472 47.795 9.677
10 0.748 0.175 0.959 0.920 13.946 14.720 -0.774
11 0.749 0.400 0.809 0.650 49.261 45.500 3.761
12 0.749 0.250 0.918 0.895 13.204 18.795 -5.591
13 0.761 0.725 0.368 0.445 32.713 49.395 -16.682
14 0.764 0.345 0.858 0.780 35.151 34.320 0.831
15 0.782 0.760 0.307 0.325 33.183 43.875 -10.692
16 0.794 0.580 0.599 0.580 50.298 48.720 1.578
17 0.797 0.295 0.917 0.895 17.512 18.795 -1.283
18 0.799 0.510 0.695 0.560 64.783 49.280 15.503
19 0.811 0.820 0.209 0.270 33.273 39.420 -6.147
20 0.817 0.885 0.126 0.275 38.506 39.875 -1.369
21 0.828 0.800 0.222 0.530 69.519 49.820 19.699
22 0.832 0.925 0.068 0.290 46.031 41.180 4.851
23 0.835 0.505 0.726 0.635 46.294 46.355 -0.061
24 0.838 0.760 0.300 0.555 56.473 49.395 7.078
25 0.847 0.510 0.729 0.680 42.803 43.520 -0.717
26 0.849 0.865 0.126 0.165 23.458 27.555 -4.097
27 0.863 0.830 0.177 0.340 45.894 44.880 1.014
28 0.865 0.720 0.352 0.575 59.895 48.875 11.020
29 0.883 0.890 0.078 0.120 19.166 21.120 -1.954
30 0.883 0.215 0.982 0.985 1.165 2.955 -1.790
31 0.891 0.840 0.140 0.150 23.869 25.500 -1.631
32 0.893 0.850 0.117 0.185 26.458 30.155 -3.697
33 0.893 0.310 0.953 0.960 6.736 7.680 -0.944
34 0.902 0.875 0.078 0.110 15.371 19.580 -4.209
35 0.917 0.710 0.363 0.590 54.410 48.380 6.030
36 0.920 0.435 0.920 0.905 16.699 17.195 -0.496
37 0.922 0.705 0.350 0.395 50.160 47.795 2.365
38 0.937 0.530 0.808 0.800 36.797 32.000 4.797
39 0.940 0.745 0.280 0.375 41.222 46.875 -5.653
40 0.942 0.930 0.026 0.030 2.665 5.820 -3.155
41 0.945 0.940 0.994 0.990 0.964 0.990 -0.026
42 0.966 0.830 0.095 0.065 10.020 12.155 -2.135
43 0.967 0.580 0.785 0.820 32.952 29.520 3.432
44 0.970 0.865 0.023 0.040 5.730 7.680 -1.950
45 0.978 0.470 0.962 0.975 5.115 4.875 0.240
46 1.010 0.335 0.997 0.990 1.012 1.980 -0.968
47 1.010 0.665 0.330 0.460 48.883 49.680 -0.797
48 1.010 0.430 0.971 0.990 3.766 1.980 1.786
49 1.010 0.525 0.990 0.995 1.295 0.995 0.300
50 1.010 0.615 0.765 0.980 19.375 3.920 15.455
51 1.010 0.540 0.972 1.000 1.307 0.000 1.307
Table 2: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of d  for Column SubjectsF
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